


Blueprint for Smart Justice
Alaska



Blueprint *for* Smart Justice Alaska

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Executive Summary

Over the past five decades, the United States has dramatically increased its reliance on the criminal justice system as a way to respond to drug addiction, mental illness, poverty, and broken schools. As a result, the United States today incarcerates more people, in both absolute numbers and per capita, than any other nation in the world. Millions of lives have been upended, and families torn apart. The mass incarceration crisis has transformed American society, damaged families and communities, and wasted trillions of taxpayer dollars.

We all want to live in safe and healthy communities, and our criminal justice policies should be focused on the most effective approaches to achieving that goal. But the current system has failed us. It's time for the United States to dramatically reduce its reliance on incarceration and invest instead in alternatives to prison, including approaches better designed to break the cycle of crime and recidivism by helping people rebuild their lives.

The ACLU's Campaign for Smart Justice is committed to transforming our nation's criminal justice system and building a new vision of safety and justice. The Campaign is dedicated to cutting the nation's incarcerated population in half and combatting racial disparities in the criminal justice system.

To advance these goals, the Campaign partnered with the Urban Institute to conduct a two-year research project to analyze the kinds of changes needed to cut the number of people in prison in each state by half and reduce racial disparities in incarceration. In every state, Urban Institute researchers identified primary drivers of incarceration. They then predicted the

impact of reducing prison admissions and length of stay on state prison populations, state budgets, and the racial disparity of those imprisoned.

The analysis was eye-opening.

In every state, we found that reducing the prison population by itself does little to diminish racial disparities in incarceration — and in some cases would worsen them. In Alaska — where the incarceration rate of Alaska Native adults was four times that of white adults in 2017¹ — reducing the number of people imprisoned will not on its own reduce racial disparities within the prison system. These findings confirm for the Campaign that urgent work remains for advocates, policymakers, and communities across the nation to focus on efforts like policing and prosecutorial reform that are specific to combatting these disparities.

As in other states across the country, Alaska's incarcerated population has experienced explosive growth in recent years. Between 1980 and 2016, the prison population grew more than fivefold.² As of 2017, Alaska had 4,237 people imprisoned in its state correctional institutions.³ This is a slight decrease from this population's peak in 2015, when more than 5,000 people were incarcerated in these facilities.⁴

Aware of the unsustainable growth of Alaska's incarcerated population, lawmakers passed comprehensive Justice Reinvestment⁵ legislation in July 2016 through Senate Bill 91. These reforms were a promising step projected to save the state \$380 million and lead to a 13 percent reduction in Alaska's prison population.⁶ Initially, the state did experience a decrease in prison admissions following S.B. 91, and according to a 2018 study of bail practices, about

25 percent of people arrested following reform were detained pretrial, compared to 52 percent of those arrested pre-reform.⁷ Unfortunately, this progress was cut short in 2017 when the Alaska Legislature rolled back portions of the reforms ushered in by S.B. 91. With crime still on the rise,⁸ the 2018 elections for Governor and State Legislature were marked by calls to repeal S.B. 91. In May 2019, legislators in Alaska passed House Bill 49, which will substantially repeal and replace S.B. 91, with overwhelming support. Under H.B. 49, it is estimated that Alaska's prison population will exceed the capacity of every existing prison facility in the state within two years.⁹

Myriad offenses drive people into Alaska's prisons. Nearly two-thirds of the 10,543 people who entered Alaskan correctional facilities in 2014¹⁰ were people convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors. The most common offenses in 2013, the most recent year of recorded data, were assault, driving while intoxicated, drug offenses, and theft.¹¹ The portion of people admitted to prison for violations of community supervision, such as parole or probation, grew in the years leading up to JRI reform. The number of supervision violation admissions increased 83 percent between 2005 and 2014.¹²

In 2016, Alaska's prisons were operating at 96 percent of capacity. While the 1990 Alaska Superior Court case *Cleary v. Smith* created population caps to address overcrowding in Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities, rollbacks of reforms in 2017 and 2019 have left Alaska at risk of a population increase that surpasses the prison population cap and could leave the state vulnerable to additional litigation.¹³

The length of time people serve in Alaska prisons is growing, due in part to Alaska's strict sentencing laws. Though S.B. 91 took crucial steps toward addressing this problem by lowering sentencing ranges for many offenses, mandatory minimum sentences for many offenses still exist.¹⁴ Between 2007 and 2017, the number of people incarcerated in Alaska who had served more than three years increased by 12 percent, accounting for nearly one in four people incarcerated in Alaska in 2017.¹⁵ Strict limits on parole eligibility also contribute to the length of time people spend in

Alaska's prisons. Although S.B. 91 expanded parole eligibility to all people with non-sex Class A felonies and all people with Class B and C felonies, the legislation didn't apply retroactively; H.B. 49 effectively returns to prior policy, so most people in prison convicted of these offenses will remain excluded.¹⁶

People of color are greatly overrepresented in the state's correctional facilities compared to white Alaskans, and Alaska Natives are particularly impacted by this disparity. Although they accounted for only 13 percent of the state adult population, Alaska Natives comprised 37 percent of the incarcerated population in Alaska in 2017. Black Alaskans are also disproportionately impacted by incarceration. As of 2017, one in 27 Black men in Alaska was incarcerated.¹⁷

Alaskan women represent a rapidly growing segment of the state's prison population. Since 2000, the number of women incarcerated has grown at more than four times the rate of increase in the number of men, nearly doubling the female prison population between 2000 and 2017.¹⁸ Alaska's prison population is also aging. Although incarcerated people age 50 or older are generally considered to pose a negligible risk to public safety,¹⁹ they represented one in five people incarcerated in Alaska in 2017.²⁰ Further, there are a concerning number of people incarcerated in Alaska who have mental health and substance use needs. In 2012, approximately two-thirds of the incarcerated population in Alaska was considered to be a "Trust beneficiary,"²¹ which includes people with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and substance use disorders, among other conditions. In 2018, the Alaska DOC estimated that four in five people incarcerated in Alaska had a substance use disorder.²²

So, what's the path forward?

To start, criminal justice stakeholders in Alaska must invest in and expand alternatives to incarceration. Programs offering support services such as substance use treatment, mental health care, employment, housing, health care, and vocational training can significantly reduce recidivism rates for participants.²³ Alaska's therapeutic courts, of which there are 12 statewide, should be expanded by lawmakers. The

Legislature can also expand access to these courts by amending the law governing therapeutic courts to allow participation to be voluntary, removing the eligibility requirement that a person enter a no contest or guilty plea.

Expanding mental health and substance use treatment programs is also an essential step. Alaska's criminal justice reforms have resulted in the reinvestment of more than \$1.3 million since 2017 to expand substance use disorder treatment, yet sufficient treatment capacity remains a statewide issue.²⁴ Alaska's Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP), for example, should be expanded. The governor and Legislature should also consider providing flexible funding to the Division of Behavioral Health for community-based providers to provide mental health treatment and social services that are not reimbursed by Medicaid.²⁵ In order to support and maintain treatment options, the governor and Legislature must abandon efforts to repeal Alaska's Medicaid expansion.

The Alaska Legislature should return to the reform principles it enacted through S.B. 91 and continue to pursue evidence-informed policies to reduce time served while protecting public safety. Evidence indicates that long prison sentences do not have any greater deterrent effect than shorter sentences.²⁶ Lowering the statutory maximum term of imprisonment possible across all felony classes and expanding parole eligibility to all offenses, for example, are two places to start. Alaska's Legislature should also build on its progress by expanding eligibility for presumptive parole,²⁷ expanding access to compassionate release, and consider broadening the availability of earned credits against a prison sentence through participation in educational, vocational, and other opportunities.

If Alaska were to adopt the changes outlined in this Smart Justice 50-State Blueprint's forecaster chart and achieve a 50 percent reduction in its prison population, the state could save more than \$337 million by 2025 — money that could be better spent on schools, infrastructure, and services for Alaskans.

Ultimately, the answer is up to Alaska's voters, policymakers, communities, and criminal justice

advocates as they move forward with the urgent work of ending Alaska's obsession with mass incarceration.

The State of the Alaska Prison System


Alaska’s prison population grew more than fivefold between 1980 and 2016.²⁸ At its peak in 2015, Alaska incarcerated more than 5,000 people in state institutions,²⁹ up 40 percent from 2000.³⁰ In 2017, Alaska had 4,237 people incarcerated in state correctional institutions.³¹

These trends, along with projections of continued growth in incarceration in coming years, spurred Alaska to pass comprehensive Justice Reinvestment legislation in July 2016 through S.B. 91.³² At the time, the reforms were expected to lead to a 13 percent reduction in the prison population by 2024 through pretrial, sentencing, and corrections reforms, saving the state approximately \$380 million.³³ Despite warnings from experts that returning to ineffective, tough-on-crime policies would be costly to the state and would not increase public safety,³⁴ the Alaska

Legislature passed legislation in 2017 rolling back portions of the reforms, including increasing presumptive sentencing ranges for low-level offenses.³⁵ Then, in May 2019, efforts to repeal and replace S.B. 91 made significant gains in the legislature.

These changes are likely to reverse the predicted population reduction effects of S.B. 91, as the changes in H.B. 49 are anticipated, within one year, to require the reopening of the Palmer Correctional Center, and within two years, to exceed the capacity of every prison facility in the state.³⁶ The state experienced a decrease in prison admissions following the passage of S.B. 91; however, the 2017 rollbacks, coupled with increased investment in law enforcement at the state and local levels, had already resulted in a return to a rising prison admissions rate.³⁷

ALASKA PRISON POPULATION



AT A GLANCE

ALASKA PRISONS

Between 1980 and 2016, Alaska's prison population grew more than **fivefold**.

As of 2017, more than **4,200 people** were incarcerated in Alaska.


As of this report's publication, the ultimate fate of Alaska's Justice Reinvestment reforms seems bleak. Governor Michael J. Dunleavy used his first State of the State Address in January 2019 to declare "war on criminals" and issue a vow to "repeal and replace" S.B. 91, and as of May 2019, a bill to do just that was enacted by the Alaska Legislature.³⁸ Fiscal estimates of the Legislature's plan, which would largely return the state to pre-S.B. 91 policy, indicate these measures would require roughly \$50 million in additional annual prison costs after the first year, and the resulting population increase would exceed the current capacity of the prison system.³⁹

What Is Driving People Into Prison?⁴⁰

In Alaska, a litany of offenses⁴¹ drives people into prisons. In 2014,⁴² Alaska admitted 10,543 people with criminal sentences to state correctional facilities. Of these admissions, nearly two-thirds (62 percent) were people convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors. Additionally, 20,039 people were admitted to Alaska correctional facilities pretrial in 2014. Between 2005 and 2014, pretrial admissions declined 13 percent.⁴³ According to a 2018 study of bail practices based on a sample of more than 300 cases, about three-quarters of people arrested after S.B. 91 were released pretrial, compared to less than half (48 percent) of people arrested pre-reform.⁴⁴

In 2013, the most recent year of recorded available data, the most common offenses for people with criminal convictions entering incarceration in Alaska were assault (18 percent), driving while intoxicated (15 percent), drug offenses (10 percent), and theft (9 percent). Offenses classified as public order or other, which include things like failure to appear in court and transportation offenses, accounted for 39 percent of admissions in that year.⁴⁵

ALASKA POST-CONVICTION ADMISSIONS TO INCARCERATION BY TOP OFFENSE TYPES (2013)



Admissions for nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors declined significantly between 2005 and 2014, down 17 percent for pretrial admissions for people facing charges and 11 percent for post-conviction admissions. Still, nonviolent offenses and supervision violations accounted for nearly three-fourths (74 percent) of all 2014 admissions to incarceration in Alaska. Overall, 75 percent of post-conviction admissions in 2014 were for nonviolent offenses.⁴⁶

Alaska correctional facilities continue to admit people every year from community supervision, either for technical revocations or new crimes. The number of supervision violation admissions increased 83 percent between 2005 and 2014, reaching 8,351 admissions in 2014.⁴⁷

Alaska has harsh laws that trigger mandatory prison sentences for individuals in many situations, including when someone has a prior felony conviction. In particular, Alaska law requires judges to impose a 99-year sentence for a third conviction for certain serious felonies.⁴⁸

The Current Prison Population

Property offenses accounted for 12 percent of all people incarcerated in Alaska in 2017. Drug offenses accounted for an additional 5 percent, and alcohol offenses accounted for 4 percent. Additionally, public order and public administration offenses – such


AT A GLANCE

ALASKA JAIL AND PRISON POPULATION

75 percent of all 2014 post-conviction prison admissions in Alaska were for nonviolent offenses.

12 percent of people in Alaska prisons in 2017 were incarcerated for property offenses.

ALASKA PRISON POPULATION BY OFFENSE TYPE (2017)



as perjury and disorderly conduct – accounted for approximately one in seven (14 percent) people incarcerated in 2017. Less than half (48 percent) of people incarcerated in Alaska were serving time for a violent or sex offense.⁴⁹

In 2016, the Council of State Governments reported that Alaska’s prisons were operating at 91 percent of capacity.⁵⁰ In order to eliminate overcrowding, a 1990 settlement agreement resulting from Alaska Supreme Court case *Cleary v. Smith* created population caps for each Alaska DOC facility.⁵¹ However, with recent legislation that threatens to reverse the population decrease that followed Justice Reinvestment reforms, Alaska risks a population increase that surpasses the prison population caps and could leave the state vulnerable to additional litigation.⁵²

Why Do People Stay in Prison for So Long?

More than half (52 percent) of all people incarcerated in Alaska state facilities as of July 1, 2017, had been there for six months or less, due to the large number of people incarcerated pretrial. Between 2007 and 2017, the number of people incarcerated in Alaska who had served more than three years increased 12 percent,

AT A GLANCE

LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT AT A GLANCE

The number of people in Alaska prisons who had served **more than three years** increased 12 percent between 2007 and 2017.

The length of time served for people imprisoned for public order offenses grew **91 percent** between 2005 and 2014.

however, accounting for nearly one in four people (22 percent) incarcerated in Alaska in 2017.⁵³

According to the most recently available data (2014), the average length of stay for people with criminal convictions serving time in Alaska state facilities grew substantially in recent years. In 2014, the average person serving time for a nonviolent felony had served 266 days in an Alaska facility, 32 percent more time than the average person had served in 2005. The average person serving time for a violent felony had spent nearly two years (677 days) in a state facility, up 35 percent since 2005. The growth in time served was particularly extreme for people serving time for alcohol and public order offenses, which increased 57 percent and 91 percent, respectively, between 2005 and 2014.⁵⁴

Alaska's criminal code continues to impose strict sentencing laws, which include mandatory minimum sentences for many offenses that require judges to adhere to strict sentencing ranges regardless of circumstance.⁵⁵

For many years, Alaska severely limited who was eligible to apply for discretionary parole release. Until 2016, the criminal code completely withheld parole eligibility for anyone convicted of a Class A felony, a Class B felony with even one prior felony conviction, or a Class C felony with two or more prior felony convictions. Restrictions of this kind severely limited the ability of state actors to use smart release options

for people in prison. Alaska's Justice Reinvestment legislation (S.B. 91) addressed many of these issues, expanding parole eligibility to all people with non-sex Class A felonies and all people with Class B and Class C felonies, but the changes made through legislation were not applied retroactively, so many people incarcerated in Alaska are still subject to these exclusions.⁵⁶

Who Is Imprisoned

Alaska Natives: Incarceration has a disproportionate impact on communities of color in Alaska. Although they accounted for only 13 percent of the state adult population, Alaska Natives comprised 37 percent of the incarcerated population in Alaska in 2017, and one in 26 Alaska Native men in the state was incarcerated. In the same year, the incarceration rate of Alaska Native adults (2,100 per 100,000) was four times that of white adults.⁵⁷

Black Alaskans: As of 2017, one in 27 Black men in Alaska was incarcerated. In 2017, Black people accounted for 10 percent of people incarcerated in Alaska but only 3 percent of the state adult population. In the same year, the incarceration rate for Black adults in Alaska (2,341 per 100,000) was more than four times that of white adults.⁵⁸

Alaskan Women: Since 2000, the number of women incarcerated has grown at more than four times the rate of increase in the number of men, nearly doubling between 2000 and 2017. As of July 2017, women

AT A GLANCE

DEMOGRAPHICS AT A GLANCE

1 in 26 Alaska Native men was incarcerated in 2017.

The number of women in Alaska prisons nearly **doubled** between 2000 and 2017.

Nearly **1 in 5** people incarcerated in Alaska in 2017 was 50 or older.

AT A GLANCE

MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS

Approximately **two-thirds** of Alaska's incarcerated population in 2012 was categorized as "Trust beneficiaries," which includes people with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and substance use disorders.

accounted for 9 percent of people incarcerated in Alaska.⁵⁹

Elderly Alaskans: Though generally considered to pose a negligible risk to public safety,⁶⁰ the incarcerated population age 50 or older grew 43 percent in Alaska between 2007 and 2017. People age 50 or older accounted for nearly one in five (19 percent) people incarcerated in Alaska in 2017.⁶¹

People With Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders

In 2012, approximately two-thirds of the incarcerated population in Alaska was considered to be a "Trust beneficiary," which includes people with mental illness, developmental disabilities, and substance use disorders, among other conditions. On average, Trust beneficiaries spend a significantly longer period of time incarcerated than other incarcerated people.⁶² Additionally, the Alaska DOC estimated that four

in five people incarcerated in Alaska in 2018 had a substance use disorder.⁶³

Budget Strains

As Alaska's prison population has risen, so has the cost burden. Alaska spent \$323 million of its general fund on corrections in 2017, accounting for more than 7 percent of the state's general fund expenditures. These costs have doubled since 1985, while general fund spending on other state priorities like education has declined.⁶⁴

AT A GLANCE

BUDGET

Alaska spent **\$323 million** of its general fund on corrections in 2017.

Corrections costs in Alaska have **doubled** since 1985.

Ending Mass Incarceration in Alaska: A Path Forward

Mass incarceration is a result of many systems failing to support our communities. To end it, we must develop policies that better address inadequacies throughout our education, health care, and economic systems – to name a few. There are many potential policy changes that can help Alaska end its mass incarceration crisis, but it will be up to the people and policymakers of Alaska to decide which changes to pursue. To reach a 50 percent reduction, policy reforms will need to reduce the amount of time people serve in prisons and/or reduce the number of people entering jail and prison in the first place.

Reducing Admissions

To end mass incarceration, Alaska must break its overreliance on jails and prisons as a means to hold people accountable for their crimes. Evidence indicates that prisons seldom offer adequate solutions to wrongful behavior. In fact, imprisonment can be counterproductive – increasing cycles of harm and violence, and failing to provide rehabilitation for incarcerated people or adequate accountability to the survivors of crime.⁶⁵ Here are some strategies:

- **Alternatives to incarceration:** The good news is that alternatives exist. Several types of alternative-to-incarceration programs have shown great success in reducing both violent and nonviolent criminal activity. Programs offering support services such as substance use treatment, mental health care, employment, housing, health care, and vocational training – often with a community service requirement – have significantly reduced recidivism rates for participants.⁶⁶ Among other options, lawmakers

should consider expansion of Alaska’s therapeutic courts, which avoid some of the negative effects of incarceration while offering participants a more direct path to treatment and rehabilitation if they have committed crimes associated with behavioral health, mental health, and/or substance use disorders.

The Alaska Court System operates 12 therapeutic courts statewide, but they are underutilized, and access depends on geographic location. These courts function with the input and partnership of various criminal justice, health, and social services stakeholders, including but not limited to the judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer, case manager, and mental health treatment provider. Alaska’s Legislature should amend the law governing therapeutic courts to allow participation to be voluntary, removing the eligibility requirement that a person enter a no contest or guilty plea – a barrier to participation.

For crimes involving violence, restorative justice programs – which are designed to hold responsible people accountable and support those who were harmed – can be particularly promising. When they are rigorous and well implemented, these processes have not only been demonstrated to reduce recidivism for defendants,⁶⁷ but they have also been shown to decrease symptoms of posttraumatic stress in victims of crime.⁶⁸ Prosecutors and judges who embrace these solutions can fulfill their responsibilities to the public and support victims in their healing – and can often generate far better results than imprisonment can deliver. Other successful models include programs that

divert people to treatment and support services before arrest, and programs led by prosecutors that divert people before they are charged. Lawmakers can explore such interventions at multiple phases in the system, whether through decriminalization or alternatives to arrest, charges, or incarceration.

- **Expanded treatment — mental health:** Mental health diversion is an effective way to redirect people with disabilities out of the criminal legal system and into supportive community treatment. Diversion programs have been shown to be effective for people charged with both nonviolent and violent offenses.⁶⁹ When implemented effectively, diversion reduces arrests, encourages voluntary treatment in the community, and saves money.⁷⁰ Effective diversion programs coordinate with community services that provide a wide range of substantial, quality wraparound treatment and support for people with disabilities to access housing, employment, and intensive, individualized supports in the community. After an initial investment in community supports, diversion programs have the potential to save jurisdictions large amounts of money.⁷¹ One way to support treatment options is for the governor and Legislature to provide flexible funding to the Division of Behavioral Health for community-based providers to provide mental health treatment and social services that are not reimbursed by Medicaid.⁷² To maintain a sustainable funding structure for these services, the governor and Legislature must abandon efforts to repeal Alaska’s Medicaid expansion. Medicaid is imperative so that Alaskans continue to have access to mental health and substance abuse treatment while on probation or parole, and after their separation from the criminal justice system.
- **Expanded treatment — addiction:** Substance use disorders are often underlying drivers of a substantial number of crimes, including and especially more serious offenses like burglaries, robberies, and assaults. Addressing

substance abuse through treatment rather than incarceration can more effectively reduce crime.⁷³ For example, Alaska’s Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP) provides screening and treatment referral services for thousands of people charged with misdemeanors who are referred by the court. Alaska’s criminal justice reforms have resulted in the reinvestment of more than \$1.3 million since 2017 to expand substance use disorder treatment, yet sufficient treatment capacity remains a statewide issue.⁷⁴ In community-based settings, months-long waiting lists for treatment are not uncommon. The Legislature and governor must provide additional investment both in treatment capacity and in operating support in order to

A NOTE ON SPECIALTY COURTS

Many jurisdictions assign some people to “specialty courts” such as mental health, behavioral, veterans, and drug courts. The ACLU has concerns about the growing use of these courts. They may violate due process rights, including the rights to notice, hearing, and counsel, and may needlessly subject people with disabilities to criminal justice control. And they require significant resources that would be better spent providing upfront services in the community.

Specialty court providers must be disability-competent and informed in public health, addiction, and treatment. People in these courts must have access to counsel, and supervision should not last beyond the length of any sentence that would have been imposed for the underlying charge. Participants should be allowed to quit the program and either take a plea agreement or stand trial, protected by all due process rights, at any time. All programs must be tailored to meet individual needs, including having specialized, evidence-based options for people with dual diagnoses (mental health and substance use disorders). Finally, the response to lapses or non-compliance should be enhanced case management, not incarceration.

provide the continuity of care that can address an individual's criminogenic needs.

- **Maintaining appropriate judicial discretion:** The Legislature can also limit the circumstances in which a judge is required to impose a prison sentence instead of community supervision, especially for drug offenses and in situations when the mandatory prison sentence is triggered by a prior felony. Judges must also have a variety of options at their disposal besides imprisonment, allowing them to require treatment, mental health care, restorative justice, or other evidence-based alternatives to incarceration. These programs should be available to the court in all or most cases, regardless of the severity of the offense or someone's prior criminal history. The court, not the Legislature, should be in a position to decide whether such an option is appropriate in individual cases.

Reducing Time Served

Reducing the amount of time people serve, even by just a few months, can lead to thousands of fewer people in Alaska's prisons. Alaska's own experience with justice reform since the implementation of S.B. 91 in 2016 has shown that integrating these approaches can pay dividends.⁷⁵ The Alaska Legislature should protect these measures and continue to pursue evidence-informed policies to reduce time served while protecting public safety, as follows:

- **Sentencing reform – general:** The Legislature should amend Alaska's criminal code to reduce sentencing ranges, including and especially for drug offenses, burglary and other property offenses, robbery, public order offenses, and assault. Evidence indicates that long prison sentences do not have any greater deterrent effect than shorter sentences.⁷⁶ The Alaska Legislature should lower the statutory maximum term of imprisonment possible across all felony classes and expand parole eligibility to all offenses. For instance, Alaska should drastically decrease the maximum sentence

for first- and second-degree homicide, which is currently set at 99 years, with the former being parole ineligible.⁷⁷

Also, as recently as 2016, Alaska increased mandatory minimum terms – sentences created by legislatures requiring a person to serve a required term in prison based on offense, rather than allowing the court to consider the facts and circumstances of each individual case.⁷⁸ Further, H.B. 49 will increase the minimum terms in sentencing ranges for a number of crime classifications.⁷⁹ Another step the state Legislature should take to increase fairness in the criminal justice system is to abolish mandatory minimums or, at a minimum, create a safety valve allowing judges to depart from statutory sentencing requirements.

- **Sentencing reform – enhancements:** The Legislature can also limit the circumstances and the severity of Alaska's prior felony sentencing in which the presence of even a single prior felony can both substantially increase one's sentencing range for a new offense and delay parole eligibility timing. Judges should apply sentencing enhancements only in the most serious circumstances. The Legislature should pass a law that explicitly prohibits misdemeanors and low-level felonies from triggering sentencing enhancements.
- **Parole reform:** Improving parole and release policies and practices to ensure that eligible people are paroled more quickly is another key way to reduce the amount of time people spend in prison. Alaska's Legislature should expand eligibility for presumptive parole, a release mechanism that presumes release to community supervision without a hearing.⁸⁰ Additionally, the parole board should reform its policies to allow for a more objective process, requiring a current and articulable threat to public safety (not based on offense) in cases where petitioners are denied. The board should also allow petitioners to rebut incorrect information, lessen the authority of the prosecutor to re-litigate the original offense, and increase

“Merely reducing sentence lengths, by itself, does not disturb the basic architecture of the New Jim Crow. So long as large numbers of African Americans continue to be arrested and labeled drug criminals, they will continue to be relegated to a permanent second-class status upon their release, no matter how much (or how little) time they spend behind bars. The system of mass incarceration is based on the prison label, not prison time.”¹⁰⁵

— From *The New Jim Crow*, Michelle Alexander

transparency in decision-making for both parole grants and denials.

- **Reducing parole revocations:** In Alaska, a rising percentage of people return to prison for failing to meet a condition of their release, rather than for committing a new offense. In 2017, 73 percent of parole revocations were for technical violations, primarily for substance use or a reporting violation (e.g., missing an appointment).⁸¹ Alaska Natives and Black Alaskans are disproportionately impacted by these policies. In that same year, Alaska Natives and Black Alaskans accounted for 33 percent and 11 percent of parole revocations, respectively.⁸² One way to lower prison admissions and support successful reentry is for the Alaska DOC to maintain a system of graduated, proportional sanctions and for legislators to expressly prohibit incarceration as a response to technical violations. Further, parole revocations for technical violations often stem from physical or mental disabilities. Parole and probation officers are required to provide reasonable accommodations so that parolees with disabilities have an equal opportunity to comply with the requirements of parole. Proper training of parole officers and greater awareness of and advocacy for these requirements could

reduce the number of technical violations significantly.

- **Earned time/earned credit reform:** The use of earned credits, enacted as part of S.B. 91 but diminished in H.B. 49,⁸³ has reduced parole officer caseloads, prioritizing resources toward people considered high risk and driving high rates of successful completion of probation and parole.⁸⁴ The Alaska Legislature should consider expanding the availability of earned credits against a prison sentence through participation in educational, vocational, and other opportunities.
- **Compassionate release:** Alaska’s Legislature should expand access to compassionate release from prison. The state’s prison population is rapidly aging, in large part due to expansive categories of people who were ineligible for discretionary parole prior to the 2016 reform package, in addition to a convoluted and ineffective parole application and review process. Keeping aging and seriously injured or ill people incarcerated significantly taxes prison resources. Studies have shown that incarcerating an older (50 and above) person costs double what it costs to incarcerate a younger person.⁸⁵ What is more, keeping older people behind bars does not serve the goal of incapacitation, particularly as studies have clearly shown that as people age their propensity to commit crime significantly declines.⁸⁶ There is also clear evidence showing that older persons have much lower rates of recidivism than their younger counterparts.⁸⁷ Alaska offers Special Medical Parole,⁸⁸ but its requirements are so restrictive that people rarely qualify. Individuals over the age of 60 who have served at least 10 years of their imposed sentence⁸⁹ are eligible for release under Alaska’s geriatric parole laws, enacted in 2016 as part of S.B. 91.⁹⁰ As of October 2018, no one has been released under this program.⁹¹ Alaska’s Legislature and parole board should expand eligibility and increase release rates under its geriatric parole and special medical Parole programs.

Reducing Racial Disparities

Reducing the number of people who are imprisoned in Alaska will not on its own significantly reduce racial disparities in the prison system.

People of color (especially Black, Latino, and Alaska Native people) are at a higher risk of becoming involved in the justice system, including living under heightened police surveillance and being at higher risk for arrest. This imbalance cannot be accounted for by disparate involvement in illegal activity, and it grows at each stage in the justice system, beginning with initial law enforcement contact and increasing at subsequent stages, such as pretrial detention, conviction, sentencing, and post-release opportunity.⁹² Focusing on only one of the factors that drives racial disparity does not address issues across the whole system.

Racial disparity is so ingrained in the system that it cannot be mitigated by solely reducing the scale of mass incarceration. Shrinking the prison population across the board will likely result in lowering imprisonment rates for all racial and ethnic populations, but it will not address comparative disproportionality across populations. For example, focusing on reductions to prison admissions and length of stay in prison is critically important, but those reforms do not address the policies and practices among police, prosecutors, and judges that contribute greatly to the racial disparities that plague the prison system.

New Jersey, for example, is often heralded as one of the most successful examples of reversing mass incarceration, passing justice reforms that led to a 26 percent decline in the state prison population between 1999 and 2012.⁹³ However, the state did not target racial disparities in incarceration and, in 2014, Black people in New Jersey were still more than 12 times as likely to be imprisoned as white people — the highest disparity of any state in the nation.⁹⁴

Ending mass incarceration is critical to eliminating racial disparities but insufficient without companion efforts that take aim at other drivers of racial inequities outside of the criminal justice system. Reductions in disparate imprisonment rates require implementing explicit racial justice strategies.

Some examples include:

- Ending overpolicing in communities of color
- Evaluating prosecutors' charging and plea-bargaining practices to identify and eliminate bias
- Investing in diversion/alternatives to detention in communities of color
- Reducing the use of pretrial detention and eliminating wealth-based incarceration
- Ending sentencing enhancements based on location (drug-free school zones)
- Reducing exposure to reincarceration due to revocations from supervision
- Requiring racial impact statements before any new criminal law or regulation is passed and requiring legislation to proactively rectify any potential disparities that may result with new laws or rules
- Eliminating discriminatory gang sentencing enhancements that disproportionately target people of color
- Addressing any potential racial bias in risk assessment instruments used to assist decision-making in the criminal justice system
- Encouraging judges to use their power to dismiss cases that originate with school officials or on school grounds when the matter may be adequately addressed through school disciplinary or regulatory process to avoid incarcerating children during their most formative years
- Eliminating fines and fees, which effectively criminalize poverty
- Shifting funding from law enforcement and corrections to community organizations, job creation, schools, drug and mental health treatment, and other social service providers

Reducing Disability Disparities

The rates of people with disabilities in the U.S. criminal system are two to six times that of the general population.⁹⁵ In particular, people with psychiatric disabilities are dramatically overrepresented in jails and prisons across the country.⁹⁶

- People showing signs of mental illness are twice as likely to be arrested as people without mental illness for the same behavior.⁹⁷
- People with mental illness are sentenced to prison terms that are, on average, 12 percent longer than those of other people in prison.⁹⁸
- People with mental illness stay in prison longer because they frequently face disciplinary action from conduct that arises due to their illness – such as attempted suicide – and they seldom qualify for early release because they are not able to participate in rehabilitative programming, such as educational or vocational classes.⁹⁹

TAKING THE LEAD

Police: They are generally the first point of contact with the criminal justice system. The practices that police employ in communities can shape the public's view of and trust in the criminal justice system. Police can decide whether or not to arrest people and how much force to use during encounters with the public. Police departments can also participate in diversion programs, which enable officers to divert people into community-based intervention programs, rather than into the criminal justice system.

Prosecutors: The attorney general, an appointee of the governor, sets the policies for prosecutors' offices across Alaska. Within parameters set by the Department of Law, they make decisions on when to prosecute an arrest, what charges to bring, and which plea deals to offer and accept. They can decide to divert people to treatment programs (for example, drug or mental health programs) rather than send them to prison. And they can decide not to charge enhancements that greatly increase the length of sentences.

State lawmakers: They decide which offenses to criminalize, what penalties to include, how long sentences can be, and when to take away discretion from judges. They can change criminal laws to remove prison as an option when better alternatives exist, and they can also fund the creation of new alternatives, including diversion programs that provide supported housing, treatment, and vocational training. And they can decide to sufficiently fund mental health and substance abuse treatment so it is available for people who need it before they encounter the criminal legal system.

Parole boards: They decide when to allow people to leave prison. If the parole board is trained to consider and accommodate disability issues, they may recognize and release more people who have disciplinary issues in their records that are due to a lack of accommodations for their disabilities.

Judges: They often have discretion over pretrial conditions imposed on defendants, which can make a difference. For example, individuals who are jailed while awaiting trial are more likely to plead guilty and accept longer prison sentences than people who are not held in jail pretrial. Judges can also have discretion in sentencing and should consider alternatives to incarceration when possible.

Furthermore, sentencing reforms appear to leave people in prison with psychiatric disabilities behind. In recent years in California, for example, the prison population has decreased by more than 25 percent following a court order, but the number of people with a serious mental disorder has increased by 150 percent—an increase in both the rate and the absolute number of incarcerated people with psychiatric disabilities.¹⁰⁰

Screening tools to evaluate psychiatric disabilities vary by state and jurisdiction, but the most reliable data indicates that more than half of jail populations and close to half of prison populations have mental health disabilities.¹⁰¹ The fact that people with mental health disabilities are arrested more frequently, stay incarcerated longer, and return to prisons faster is not due to any inherent criminality related to psychiatric disabilities. It arises in part because of the lack of accessible and appropriate mental health treatment in the community; in part because of a perception of dangerousness by police, prosecutors, and judges; and in part because prison staff and probation officers fail to recognize and accommodate disability.

Many people of color in jails and prisons are also people with disabilities, and efforts to reduce racial disparities must go hand in hand with efforts to reduce disability disparities.¹⁰² Not surprisingly, many of the strategies to reduce disability disparities are similar to approaches that reduce racial disparities. Some examples include:

- Investing in pre-arrest diversion:
 - Expanding crisis intervention training for law enforcement and integrating mental health practitioners into crisis intervention response
 - Creating crisis stabilization centers, run by the Department of Health and Social Services, as alternatives to jails, or emergency rooms for people experiencing mental health crises or addiction
 - Training dispatchers and police to divert people with mental health issues who commit low-level nuisance crimes to these

behavioral health centers. Jurisdictions that have followed this approach have significantly reduced their jail populations.¹⁰³

- Ending arrest and incarceration for low-level public order charges, such as being drunk in public, urinating in public, loitering, trespassing, vandalism, and sleeping on the street. If needed, refer people who commit these crimes to behavioral health centers.
- Requiring prosecutors to offer diversion for people with mental health and substance use needs who are charged with low-level crimes
- Evaluating prosecutors' charging and plea-bargaining practices to identify and eliminate disability bias
- Requiring prosecutors' offices be transparent in their hiring practices, charging decisions, and plea deals
- Requiring that presentence reports provide judges information on any behavioral health conditions that may be amenable to treatment, as well as recommendations for appropriate treatment in the community¹⁰⁴
- Investing in diversion programs and alternatives to detention designed for people with disabilities, including programs that provide supportive housing, Assertive Community Treatment, wraparound services, and mental health supports
- Reducing the use of pretrial detention while increasing reminders of court dates and other supports to ensure compliance with pretrial requirements
- Reducing reincarceration due to parole or probation revocations through intensive case management, disability-competent training for officers on alternatives to incarceration and reasonable modifications to requirements of supervision, and no return to incarceration for first and second technical violations

- Addressing bias against mental disabilities in risk assessment instruments used to assist decision-making in the criminal justice system
- Shifting funding away from law enforcement and corrections into supportive housing, intensive case management, schools, drug and mental health treatment, community organizations, job creation, and other social service providers

Forecaster Chart

There are many pathways to cutting the prison population in Alaska by 50 percent. To help end mass incarceration, communities and policymakers will need to determine the optimal strategy to do so. This table presents one potential matrix of reductions that can contribute to cutting the state prison population in half by 2025. The reductions in admissions and length of stay for each offense category were selected based on potential to reduce the prison population, as well as other factors. To chart your own path to reducing mass incarceration in Alaska, visit the interactive online tool at <https://urban.is/ppf>.

CUTTING BY 50%: PROJECTED REFORM IMPACTS ON POPULATION, DISPARITIES, AND BUDGET

Impact Compared to 2025 Baseline*				
Offense category**	Policy outcome	Prison population impact	Impact on racial and ethnic makeup of prison population***	Cost savings****
Public order offenses*****	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce average time served by 50% (from 0.18 to 0.09 years) • Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 70% (4,182 fewer people admitted) 	20.91% reduction (926 fewer people)	White: No change Black: 1.4% increase Hispanic/Latino: 9.1% increase Native American/Alaska Native: 1.6% decrease***** Asian: 13.1% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 11.8% decrease Other: 5.7% increase	\$65,320,380
Assault	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce average time served by 50% (from 0.23 to 0.11 years) • Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 20% (576 fewer people admitted) 	8.82% reduction (391 fewer people)	White: 3.5% increase Black: 2.6% increase Hispanic/Latino: 3.9% increase Native American/Alaska Native: 5.2% decrease Asian: 0.4% decrease Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 9.6% decrease Other: 1.9% decrease	\$18,199,776

Impact Compared to 2025 Baseline*

Offense category**	Policy outcome	Prison population impact	Impact on racial and ethnic makeup of prison population***	Cost savings****
Drug offenses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce average time served by 50% (from 0.19 to 0.09 years) Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 30% (598 fewer people admitted) 	6.14% reduction (272 fewer people)	White: 2.9% decrease Black: 2.3% decrease Hispanic/Latino: 0.8% increase Native American/Alaska Native: 4.3% increase Asian: 3.6% decrease Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 6.5% increase Other: 0.4% increase	\$12,742,096
Theft	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce average time served by 60% (from 0.23 to 0.09 years) Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 30% (482 fewer people admitted) 	6.00% reduction (266 fewer people)	White: 1.2% decrease Black: 1.5% decrease Hispanic/Latino: 1.8% decrease Native American/Alaska Native: 2.0% increase Asian: 2.4% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 5.2% decrease Other: No change	\$12,411,531
DWI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce average time served by 60% (from 0.19 to 0.08 years) Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 30% (457 fewer people admitted) 	4.75% reduction (210 fewer people)	White: 1.1% decrease Black: 2.0% increase Hispanic/Latino: 0.8% decrease Native American/Alaska Native: 1.0% increase Asian: 1.6% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 5.0% increase Other: 0.4% increase	\$11,220,521
Robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduce average time served by 50% (from 0.99 to 0.49 years) Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 20% (23 fewer people admitted) 	1.55% reduction (69 fewer people)	White: 0.1% increase Black: 2.7% decrease Hispanic/Latino: 3.0% decrease Native American/Alaska Native: 1.0% increase Asian: 1.6% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 1.6% increase Other: 4.2% decrease	\$3,099,098

Impact Compared to 2025 Baseline*

Offense category**	Policy outcome	Prison population impact	Impact on racial and ethnic makeup of prison population***	Cost savings****
Burglary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce average time served by 50% (from 0.69 to 0.35 years) • Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 20% (25 fewer people admitted) 	1.19% reduction (53 fewer people)	White: 0.2% decrease Black: 0.3% increase Hispanic/Latino: 0.4% decrease Native American/Alaska Native: 0.2% increase Asian: 1.2% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 4.3% decrease Other: 0.5% decrease	\$2,541,131
Weapons offenses*****	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce average time served by 40% (from 0.43 to 0.26 years) 	0.54% reduction (24 fewer people)	White: No change Black: 0.4% decrease Hispanic/Latino: 0.6% decrease Native American/Alaska Native: 0.1% increase Asian: 1.5% decrease Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 0.5% increase Other: No change	\$1,031,158
Fraud	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce average time served by 60% (from 0.32 to 0.13 years) • Institute alternatives that reduce admissions by 30% (19 fewer people admitted) 	0.32% reduction (14 fewer people)	White: 0.2% decrease Black: 0.1% increase Hispanic/Latino: 0.3% increase Native American/Alaska Native: 0.2% increase Asian: 0.3% increase Hawaiian/Pacific Islander: 0.3% increase Other: 0.2% decrease	\$740,256

*The baseline refers to the projected prison population based on historical trends, assuming that no significant policy or practice changes are made.

**The projections in this table are based on the offense that carries the longest sentence for any given prison term. People serving prison terms may be convicted of multiple offenses in addition to this primary offense, but this model categorizes the total prison term according to the primary offense only.

***This column represents the percent change in the share of the prison population made up by each racial/ethnic group. It compares the proportion of the population made up by a group in the 2025 baseline prison population to the proportion of the population made up by that group when the reform scenario is applied. We then calculate the percent change between those two proportions. Racial and ethnic disproportionality is traditionally measured by comparing the number of people in prison – of a certain race – to the number of people in the state’s general population of that same race. For example, nationally, Black people comprise 13 percent of the population, while white people comprise 77 percent. Meanwhile, 35 percent of people in state or federal prison are Black, compared to 34 percent who are white. While the proportion of people in prison who are Black or white is equal, Black people are incarcerated at nearly three times their representation in the general population. This is evident in Alaska, where Black people make up 10 percent of the prison population but constitute only 3 percent of the state’s total adult population.

****Note: Cost impact for each individual policy change represents the effect of implementing that change alone and in 2015 dollars. The combined cost savings from implementing two or more of these changes would be greater than the sum of their combined individual cost savings, since more capital costs would be affected by the population reductions.

*****Some public order offenses include drunk or disorderly conduct, escape from custody, obstruction of law enforcement, court offenses, failure to comply with sex offense registration requirements, prostitution, and stalking, as well as other uncategorized offenses.

*****Some weapons offenses include unlawful possession, sale, or use of a firearm or other type of weapon (e.g., explosive device).

*****While it is likely that Alaska Natives make up the majority of this category, the National Corrections Reporting Program does not report separate categories for Alaska Natives and American Indians, and thus we are unable to distinguish between the two groups here.

Total Fiscal Impact

If Alaska were to implement reforms leading to the changes above, 2,224 fewer people would be in prison in the state by 2025, a 50.23 percent decrease. This would lead to a total cost savings of \$337,108,957 by 2025.

Methodology Overview

This analysis uses prison term record data from the National Corrections Reporting Program to estimate the impact of different policy outcomes on the size of Alaska’s prison population, racial and ethnic representation in the prison population, and state corrections spending. First, trends in admissions and exit rates for each offense category in recent years are analyzed and projected out to estimate a baseline state prison population projection through 2025, assuming recent trends will continue. Then, a mathematical model is used to estimate how various offense-specific reform scenarios (for example, a 10 percent reduction in admissions for drug possession or a 15 percent reduction in length of stay for robbery) would change the 2025 baseline projected prison population. The model allows for reform scenarios to include changes to the number of people admitted to prison and/or the average length of time served for specific offenses. The model then estimates the effect that these changes would have by 2025 on the number of people in prison, the racial and ethnic makeup of the prison population, and spending on prison. The analysis assumes that the

changes outlined will occur incrementally and be fully realized by 2025.

All results are measured in terms of how outcomes under the reform scenario differ from the baseline projection for 2025. Prison population size impacts are measured as the difference between the 2025 prison population under the baseline scenario and the forecasted population in that year with the specified changes applied. Impacts on the racial and ethnic makeup of the 2025 prison population are measured by comparing the share of the prison population made up by a certain racial or ethnic group in the 2025 baseline population to that same statistic under the reform scenario and calculating the percent change between these two proportions. Cost savings are calculated by estimating the funds that would be saved each year based on prison population reductions relative to the baseline estimate, assuming that annual savings grow as less infrastructure is needed to maintain a shrinking prison population. Savings relative to baseline spending are calculated in each year between the last year of available data and 2025, and then added up to generate a measure of cumulative dollars saved over that time period.

Endnotes

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- 10 Note: The admissions data included here is the most recent available data. Because admissions data and population data come from different sources, this report includes more recent population data (see section titled "The Current Prison Population").
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- 16 Pew Charitable Trusts, *Alaska's Criminal Justice Reforms* (December 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~media/assets/2016/12/alaskas_criminal_justice_reforms.pdf.
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- 26 See Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S. Nagin, "Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?" *Criminology & Public Policy* 10, no. 1 (February 2011): 13-54; see also Giovanni Mastrobuoni and David Rivers, "Criminal Discount Factors and Deterrence," *Criminology eJournal* (2016).
- 27 Presumptive parole could also be structured in a way that allows the parole board to request a hearing, but the person shall be released unless the board proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual remains a risk to public safety and should not be released.
- 28 BJS, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool, Total Jurisdictional Population.
- 29 Alaska has a unified correctional system, meaning all people incarcerated pretrial and serving time in both jails and prisons are under the jurisdiction of the Alaska DOC. In addition to the people incarcerated in prisons and in state jails, the Alaska DOC also incarcerates people in community jails and community residential centers. As of July 2017, Alaska incarcerated 361 people in community residential centers. There are also a number of people (15 in 2017) under Alaska DOC jurisdiction held in out-of-state correctional facilities (Alaska DOC, *2017 Offender Profile*, <http://www.correct.state.ak.us/admin/docs/2017Profile.pdf>). For the purposes of this Blueprint, the prison population refers to the total population under the jurisdiction of the Alaska DOC.
- 30 Alaska DOC, *Offender Profile reports (2002-2017)*, <http://www.correct.state.ak.us/administrative-services/research-records>.
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 - 39 Alaska DOC, Fiscal Notes 39, 41 and 42 for H.B. 49, State of Alaska 2019 Legislative Session (May 20, 2019). (http://www.akleg.gov/basis/Bill/Detail/31?Root=hb%2049#tab2_4).
 - 40 Admissions for incarceration refers to the number of people entering Alaska state facilities in a given year, while the total incarcerated population refers to the total number of people incarcerated at the end of each year.
 - 41 Offense breakdowns in this Blueprint are based on the most serious, or “controlling,” offense for which a person in prison is serving time. Some people in prison are serving time for multiple convictions and are categorized here only under the controlling offense types.
 - 42 Note: The admissions data included here is the most recent available data. Because admissions data and population data come from different sources, this report includes more recent population data (see section titled “The Current Prison Population”).
 - 43 Pew Charitable Trusts, “[Alaska Data Analysis – Part 1: Prison Drivers](#)” (presentation to the Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, June 18, 2015).
 - 44 Alaska Criminal Justice Commission, *2018 Annual Report* (November 1, 2018), <http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/docs/ar/2018.pdf>.
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 - 50 Heather Perkins, “Chapter 9: Selected State Policies and Programs” (Table 9.22) in *Book of the States 2018* (Council of State Governments, 2018), <http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2018-chapter-9-selected-state-policies-and-programs>.
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 - 62 Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, *Alaska Scorecard: Key Issues Impacting Alaska Mental Health Trust Beneficiaries* (December 2015), http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/HealthPlanning/Documents/scorecard/2015%20Trust%20Scorecard_FINAL_1-20-2016.pdf. The Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority is a state corporation that administers a perpetual trust to ensure Alaska has a comprehensive, integrated mental health program.
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